What Am I Looking at? Interpreting Dynamic and Static Gaze Displays by Wermeskerken, M. (Margot) van et al.
Cognitive Science (2017) 1–33
Copyright © 2017 The Authors. Cognitive Science published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. on behalf of
Cognitive Science Society.
All rights reserved.
ISSN: 0364-0213 print / 1551-6709 online
DOI: 10.1111/cogs.12484
What Am I Looking at? Interpreting Dynamic and Static
Gaze Displays
Margot van Wermeskerken,a,b Damien Litchfield,c Tamara van Goga,b
aDepartment of Education, Utrecht University
bInstitute of Psychology, Erasmus University Rotterdam
cDepartment of Psychology, Edge Hill University
Received 18 August 2015; received in revised form 28 November 2016; accepted 11 January 2017
Abstract
Displays of eye movements may convey information about cognitive processes but require
interpretation. We investigated whether participants were able to interpret displays of their own or
others’ eye movements. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants observed an image under three dif-
ferent viewing instructions. Then they were shown static or dynamic gaze displays and had to
judge whether it was their own or someone else’s eye movements and what instruction was
reflected. Participants were capable of recognizing the instruction reflected in their own and some-
one else’s gaze display. Instruction recognition was better for dynamic displays, and only this con-
dition yielded above chance performance in recognizing the display as one’s own or another
person’s (Experiments 1 and 2). Experiment 3 revealed that order information in the gaze displays
facilitated instruction recognition when transitions between fixated regions distinguish one viewing
instruction from another. Implications of these findings are discussed.
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1. Introduction
Displays of eye movements provide a window into the mind. They show what is at the
center of people’s visual attention, and they are associated with their cognitive processes
such as strategy use (Just & Carpenter, 1985) and insight problem solving (e.g., Grant &
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Spivey, 2003; Knoblich, Ohlsson, & Raney, 2001). As Yarbus stated in his classic study:
“Eye movements reflect the human thought process; so the observer’s thought may be
followed to some extent from the records of eye movements” (Yarbus, 1967, p. 190). In
making this association between eye movements and cognitive processes, inferences have
to be made on the basis of the display of eye movements. Essentially, this means that
one has to assign meaning to a pattern of circles or dots that are overlaid on the original
stimulus, either statically or dynamically.
The question of how well cognitive processes can be inferred from patterns of eye
movements is important in several areas. For instance, it is important for developing pat-
tern classifiers that are able to deduce an observer’s task based on his/her eye movement
pattern (Borji & Itti, 2014; Greene, Liu, & Wolfe, 2012). Such pattern classifiers not only
contribute to a richer understanding of what and how task-related cognitive processes are
reflected in eye movements (e.g., cognitive relevance hypothesis, see e.g., Ballard & Hay-
hoe, 2009; Hayhoe & Ballard, 2005), but also are of practical importance as they may lead
to technological advances enabling adaptive web search or providing adaptive information
or feedback, to name just a few applications, based on a person’s eye movements (see
Borji & Itti, 2014). In addition, it is important for research on cognition and learning,
where replays of one’s own eye movements are being used to cue verbal reports (Hansen,
1991; Russo, 1979; Van Gog, Paas, Van Merri€enboer, & Witte, 2005), or to stimulate
reflection and evaluation (Kostons, Van Gog, & Paas, 2009). In addition, replays of other
people’s eye movements provide insight into the conditions under which observers can
take another person’s perspective and make valid inferences in terms of task or preference
based on that person’s eye movements (Foulsham & Lock, 2014; Zelinsky, Peng, & Sama-
ras, 2013). Moreover, in education and training, replays of other people’s eye movements
may guide observers to new perspectives on problems and thereby improve their perfor-
mance (Litchfield & Ball, 2011; Litchfield, Ball, Donovan, Manning, & Crawford, 2010) or
may help them make more sense of task demonstrations, thereby improving learning (Jaro-
dzka, Van Gog, Dorr, Scheiter, & Gerjets, 2013; Van Gog, Jarodzka, Scheiter, Gerjets, &
Paas, 2009). This study investigates whether observers are able to make inferences based on
their own and another person’s gaze display in terms of (a) the task associated with the gaze
display and (b) whether or not the displayed eye movements are his/her own.
1.1. Interpreting gaze displays in terms of cognitive processes
Yarbus (1967) demonstrated that cognitive processes evoked by different instructions
resulted in distinct eye movement patterns when viewing a picture of a painting (i.e., The
Unexpected Visitor by Ilya Repin). Although his findings were based on only one obser-
ver, they have been replicated and extended over the last decade (see DeAngelus & Pelz,
2009; Tatler, Wade, Kwan, Findlay, & Velichovsky, 2010). These studies suggest that
eye movement patterns convey information about the task a person was performing while
viewing the stimulus. However, despite Yarbus’s optimism and the findings showing that
different instructions result in different viewing patterns, it is still largely an open
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question to what extent people are actually able to infer what task was being performed
from a display of eye movements.
Evidence that observers are able to draw inferences about the nature of the task based
on a static or dynamic display of eye movements is scarce and mainly comes from stud-
ies using static gaze displays. For instance, Greene et al. (2012) presented participants
with 64 grayscale photographs under four instruction conditions (i.e., “Memorize the pic-
ture,” “Determine the decade in which the picture was taken,” “Determine how well the
people in the picture know each other,” and “Determine the wealth of the people in the
picture”; p. 3) for 10 or 60 s. Subsequently, the displays of static eye movement patterns
overlaid on those pictures were classified by human observers (Experiment 4) and pattern
classifier software (Experiments 1–3). Both failed to predict a person’s task above chance
level, which suggests that neither observers nor pattern classifiers were able to infer a
person’s task based on a static eye movement pattern. However, some caution is war-
ranted in drawing conclusions from this study. That is, other than concluding that obser-
vers were not able to interpret someone else’s static eye movement pattern, an alternative
explanation might be that the different instruction conditions used by Greene et al. did
not produce distinct gaze patterns, causing poor performance in classifying these gaze
patterns (see Borji & Itti, 2014).
Evidence supporting the claim that observers can interpret someone else’s static gaze
display comes from Zelinsky et al. (2013). In their study, participants performed a cate-
gorical search task in which they had to search for either a teddy bear or a butterfly
among random category distractors (rated as high, medium, or low in similarity to the tar-
get classes). Fixation patterns of these participants were superimposed over the target-
absent displays and presented to different participants who attempted to classify the
search target reflected in the fixation pattern. Classification performance was well above
chance (i.e., 77% and higher, with chance level being 25%). This study provides tentative
evidence that observers are able to interpret another person’s static eye movement pat-
tern; nevertheless, this study used rather simple static displays (i.e., four targets located at
four distinct locations on a monitor) and contained relatively little eye movement data
(i.e., fixation data for trials lasting 700–900 ms).
Although most studies have investigated static displays, there is also some evidence
that observers are able to interpret another person’s dynamic gaze displays (Foulsham &
Lock, 2014). In their study, participants had to first determine which fractal out of four
within one display they liked most for 18 trials (“truth” block). Then, participants were
presented with dynamic gaze displays from the previous participant and had to judge
which of the four depicted fractals the previous participant had chosen. Finally, partici-
pants received another 18 trials with similar four-fractal-displays within which they were
instructed to deceive the next participant by “hiding [their] decision or misleading the
guesser” (p. 6; “lie” block; information in square brackets added). Interestingly, the inter-
mediate block, within which the participant had to make a guess about which fractal the
previous participant had chosen, included trials from both the “truth” and “lie” blocks.
Results indicated that participants were well able to make inferences when the gaze dis-
plays stemmed from the “truth” block (i.e., almost 60% correct with chance level being
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25%), in which the previous participant was honest about which fractal he or she pre-
ferred. Yet, on trials in which the decision was deliberately hidden, participants per-
formed at chance level in deciding which fractal was preferred (i.e., 27%; and worse than
in a control condition in which eye movements were not displayed, i.e., almost 40%).
Moreover, to successfully hide their preference from subsequent observers, a common
strategy was for participants to make their own fixation distributions less specific (i.e.,
more evenly distributed among the four fractals). This implies that without any formal
instruction of how to (mis)interpret these gaze displays, participants tried to minimize
any distinctive markers that would help other observers interpret such gaze displays. Dif-
ferent task instructions should yield distinct gaze patterns (DeAngelus & Pelz, 2009; Yar-
bus, 1967), and so presumably, the more distinctive the gaze pattern, the more readily it
is recognized. The question still remains, however, as to whether observers are better at
making inferences about static or dynamic gaze displays.
1.2. Distinguishing your own from another’s gaze displays
In the previous studies (Foulsham & Lock, 2014; Greene et al., 2012; Zelinsky et al.,
2013), participants were asked to classify static or dynamic displays of other people’s
eye movements. However, a further open question is whether participants would be able
to recognize whether a gaze display is their own or someone else’s and whether they
would be better at classifying the instructions when a display is their own. Another open
question that is explored in this study is whether seeing dynamic replays of one’s own
eye movements would yield higher recognition rates than static displays. The temporal
aspect of dynamic replays may make them easier to follow and distinguish from other
eye movement patterns. Moreover, re-viewing their own eye movements in the temporal
order in which they occurred could trigger participants’ memory of their prior viewing
behavior, as suggested by recent findings showing that participants are able to (con-
sciously) monitor their viewing behavior after having performed a serial search task
(Marti, Bayet, & Deheane, 2015). In addition, participants who are asked to memorize
images and are then presented with the image a second time, tend to refixate the regions
they have also fixated during encoding (e.g., Foulsham & Kingstone, 2013a; Foulsham &
Underwood, 2008; Valuch, Becker, & Ansorge, 2013). Because dynamic replays inher-
ently provide spatiotemporal information, they can be expected to facilitate this re-enact-
ment compared to static displays of eye movements, and thereby facilitate recognition of
the scanpath as one’s own or someone else’s and recognition of the instruction it reflects.
One study that provided anecdotal evidence wherein participants are not always aware
that a presented dynamic replay of eye movements was not their own comes from Hansen
(1991). In his experiment, participants were trained to use a text editor program, after
which they had to perform several subtasks while their eyes were being tracked. Subse-
quently, participants were shown a video recording of their task performance with or
without a replay of eye movements and were asked to explain their problem solving (i.e.,
cued retrospective reports vs. retrospective reports). To explore the validity of the cued
retrospective reports, two participants were presented with a replay of someone else’s eye
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movements displayed over a video of the performed task (on a task they also had per-
formed themselves), while they were under the impression they would report on their
own task performance. Interestingly, these participants were not told that the replay might
be from someone else and were not instructed to determine whether it was their own or
someone else’s. Nevertheless, one of these two participants discovered the deceit and
indicated that the replay was not his/hers.
A more recent study did show that observers are able to distinguish between their own and
someone else’s static gaze display (Foulsham & Kingstone, 2013b). In this experiment, par-
ticipants were explicitly instructed to make a choice about which of two statically displayed
patterns was their own. Findings showed that observers performed above chance. Yet,
although significant, performance was only slightly above chance (i.e., 54%) and the direct
on-screen comparison of one’s own and someone else’s eye movement patterns might have
facilitated recognition. Hence, the question remains as to whether observers would be able to
recognize whether a single gaze display is their own or someone else’s without having a
direct on-screen comparison. It is also of interest to investigate whether there is a difference
between static and dynamic displays in terms of recognizing whether one’s own or someone
else’s eye movements are displayed and which instructional task the eye movements reflect.
In one of the few methodological papers on gaze replays, Nalanagula, Greenstein, and
Gramopadhye (2006) demonstrated that dynamic replays led to superior performance in
knowledge transfer compared to static gaze displays. Although Nalanagula et al. focused on
performance improvements from gaze replay modeling rather than gaze interpretation per se,
in terms of this study, we can expect that dynamic replays would facilitate interpretation, as
they contain information with respect to the temporal sequence of eye movements.
2. Experiment 1
This first experiment investigated whether participants, presented with either dynamic
or static gaze displays overlaid on the original stimulus, were (a) able to meaningfully
interpret these gaze displays and (b) able to recognize whether a gaze display was their
own or someone else’s. Participants were presented with Ilya Repin’s painting The Unex-
pected Visitor under three different instruction conditions stemming from the original
work of Yarbus (1967), two of which (“estimate the ages of the people in the painting”
and “estimate how long the unexpected visitor had been away from the family”) involved
much focus on the faces of the depicted individuals, while a third required hardly any
focus on people (“remember the positions of the objects in the room”; see also DeAnge-
lus & Pelz, 2009). Participants were given 15 s to inspect the image under each of the
instructions, as pilot tests indicated that this duration resulted in displays comparable to
those used in the original work of Yarbus (1967; note that Yarbus viewing times were
109 longer) and that this was long enough to complete the task. Subsequently, they were
presented with either static or dynamic gaze displays overlaid on the original image that
were or were not their own, and they had to indicate whose eye movements were shown
(own or other) and which instruction they reflected.
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First, we explored whether performance on these two tasks was above chance or not.
Second, it was hypothesized that dynamic eye movement replays would lead to better
performance on both tasks than static displays, as replays contain more information with
respect to the temporal sequence of eye movements. Showing not only which areas were
fixated, but also in what order, might make it more obvious whether the pattern resembles
one’s own viewing behavior, as well as which instruction it represents, especially because
two of the instructions would result in looking at faces a lot, but only one (“estimate how
long the unexpected visitor had been away from the family”) would involve a lot of tran-
sitions between the various people depicted in the painting.
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
Participants were 44 Dutch undergraduate students (26 males; Mage = 20.3, SD = 1.4),
who took part in the study for course credit or a monetary reward of 5 Euro. Participants
were randomly assigned to either the dynamic (n = 22) or static (n = 22) gaze display con-
dition. Seventeen additional participants (9 males; Mage = 20.6, SD = 1.8) enrolled in the
study but had to be excluded due to technical problems (n = 7) or bad calibration measures
(i.e., deviations ≥ 0.7°, n = 10). All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
2.1.2. Materials
2.1.2.1. Stimulus and instructions: The stimulus consisted of a picture of Ilya Repin’s
painting entitled The Unexpected Visitor (cf. Yarbus, 1967). The stimulus image and
instruction conditions were presented, using SMI Experiment Center software (version
3.3; SensoMotoric Instruments GmbH, Teltow, Germany). The image covered
1,087 9 1,050 pixels and was presented centrally on a monitor with a resolution of
1,680 9 1,050 pixels (22” monitor; 48 9 30 cm; angular subtense of  43.6°). Partici-
pants were first given 15 s to freely examine the painting. Subsequently, they received
the following instructions in random order and were given 15 s of viewing time per
instruction: (a) estimate the ages of the people in the painting (“ages”), (b) remember the
positions of the objects in the room (“objects”), and (c) estimate how long the unexpected
visitor had been away from the family (“away”). In between the instructions, the painting
disappeared and a fixation cross was presented in the middle of the screen for an accumu-
lated dwell time of 1 s in order to assure that participants always started looking from
the same location for each instruction condition.
2.1.2.2. Gaze displays: Participants’ eye movements were recorded while they viewed
the painting under the different instructions, binocularly at 250 Hz, using an SMI
RED250 eye tracker (SensoMotoric Instruments GmbH, Teltow, Germany). From these
records, both static and dynamic gaze displays were generated, using SMI BeGaze soft-
ware (Version 3.2; SensoMotoric Instruments) with gaze displays being overlaid on the
original stimulus. The static displays of eye movements were generated using the “Scan
Path” utility in BeGaze with fixations defined as lasting at least 100 ms with a maximal
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dispersion of 50 pixels (cf., Litchfield et al., 2010; Litchfield & Ball, 2011; a low-speed
event detection algorithm was used to enhance generalizability to other eye-tracking sys-
tems with lower sampling frequencies). Fixations were displayed by yellow circles with a
diameter of 48 pixels and a line width of 4 pixels with consecutive fixations being con-
nected by a yellow solid line (4 pixels). Dynamic replays of eye movements were gener-
ated using the “Bee Swarm” option in BeGaze, with raw eye movement data being
displayed by a yellow circle with a diameter of 48 pixels and a line width of 6 pixels.
This type of display was chosen as the dynamic version of the “Scan Path” resulted in
staccato eye movements that were more difficult to follow with the eyes as compared to
the “Bee Swarm.” Frame rate of the output for the dynamic displays was set to 25 Hz.
For the “other” eye movement records, one of the authors acted as a model prior to the
experiment, observing the painting under the same three instruction conditions and two
additional instructions (again, the same starting location was assured for each instruction
condition so that differences between own vs. other gaze displays could not be derived from
the starting location). Static and dynamic gaze displays were generated in a similar way as the
participants’ gaze displays (see Fig. 1 for a sample of static displays). The two additional
instructions were also based on Yarbus’s study (i.e., “surmise what the family had been doing
before arrival of the unexpected visitor” and “estimate the material circumstances of the family
in the picture”). These displays were included in the recognition test as fillers in order to
decrease the likelihood of guessing correctly (see the next section, “Recognition Test”).
2.1.2.3. Recognition test: The recognition test consisted of 11 gaze displays in total. Par-
ticipants saw their own eye movements under each instruction condition twice, plus the
“other” gaze displays: three displays corresponding to the three instruction conditions par-
ticipants had seen and two filler displays that did not match the instruction conditions
participants had seen. The displays were presented in random order on the computer
screen, using E-Prime (Version 2.0; Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Sharpsburg, PA,
USA). Each gaze display was presented for a maximum of 15 s while the participants
determined (a) whether the current gaze display reflected their own eye movements or
those of another person (i.e., own/other recognition) and (b) which instruction was
reflected in the gaze display: (1) estimate the ages, (2) remember the positions of the
objects, (3) estimate how long the visitor had been away, or (4) none of these instructions
(i.e., instruction recognition). After 15 s, the gaze display area turned black, but the ques-
tions remained visible if they had not been answered yet. Questions were presented in
sequential order underneath the stimulus, with the instruction recognition task always
being presented after the own/other recognition question had been answered. Participants
answered the questions by typing the response corresponding to the answering options on
the monitor on the numeric keyboard (1 or 2 for the own/other recognition task, 1, 2, 3,
or 4 for the instruction recognition task).
2.1.3. Procedure
The experiment was run in individual sessions of approximately 30 min duration. Par-
ticipants were seated in front of the eye tracker with their head positioned in a chin and
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forehead rest in order to stabilize the head. Distance to the monitor’s center was approxi-
mately 60 cm. First, the system was calibrated using a 5-point calibration plus a 4-point
validation (after removal of participants who deviated ≥ 0.7°: dynamic condition: accu-
racy M = 0.38°, SD = 0.14°; static condition: accuracy M = 0.39°, SD = 0.13°). Then,
participants were presented with the stimulus and were allowed to engage in free viewing.
Next, they were presented with the same stimulus again three times, accompanied by the
three instructions, presented in random order. Subsequently, participants performed a
short filler task for 2–3 min (i.e., a puzzle) while the experimenter generated the gaze dis-
plays for the recognition test. Prior to performing the recognition test, participants were
Ages Away Object
P 
59
P 
47
P 
13
Fig. 1. Representation of static gaze displays of three participants of Experiment 1 in response to each
instruction condition. From left to right: “Estimate the ages of the people in the room,” “Estimate how long
the unexpected visitor had been away from his family,” and “Remember the positions of the objects in the
room.”
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presented with a display of eye movements (static or dynamic, depending of condition)
overlaid on a different image (i.e., image of Penguins) in order to familiarize them with
such a display of eye movements. Successively, participants performed the recognition
test.
2.1.4. Data analysis
For the own/other recognition task, the number of correct (and incorrect) judgments
was calculated as a function of whether it was a participant’s own or someone else’s gaze
pattern. These numbers were then used to determine d’, which is a signal detection theory
measure and reflects the overall recognition sensitivity while taking into account the false
alarm rate (i.e., a large d’ indicates a relatively high hit rate and a relatively low rate of
false positives; see MacMillan, 2002, for formulas).1 For the instruction recognition task,
the total number of correct judgments was calculated as well as the number of correct
judgments as a function of instruction type (i.e., age, away, and object).
One-sample t-tests were used to assess whether performance was above chance (i.e., for
own/other recognition task: d’ > 02 ; for instruction recognition task: number correct judg-
ments > chance [i.e., 25%]). Independent t-tests were used to analyze differences in perfor-
mance between the dynamic and static condition. Note that descriptive statistics for the
filler trials are provided (Table 1), but that these trials were excluded from the analyses.
2.2. Results and discussion
For all analyses, we used a significance level of 0.05. Cohen’s d and partial eta-
squared are reported as a measure of effect size, with d = 0.20 and g2p ¼ 0:02, d = 0.50
Table 1
Mean percentage (SD) of correct responses for both recognition tasks per condition and as function of
whether the gaze display was a participant’s own or someone else’s, and performance on each instruction
condition in Experiment 1
Dynamic Condition Static Condition
Own/other recognition 57.6 (14.8) 55.6 (17.1)
Own gaze 54.5 (22.5) 52.3 (18.0)
Other gaze 63.6 (25.0) 62.1 (23.7)
Fillers 75.0 (33.6) 65.9 (32.3)
d’ 0.42 (0.67) 0.32 (0.88)
Instruction recognition 69.7 (16.8) 57.1 (23.3)
Own gaze 72.7 (22.1) 56.1 (27.5)
Other gaze 63.6 (25.0) 59.1 (25.1)
Fillers 34.1 (32.3) 29.5 (36.7)
Age 63.6 (25.0) 53.0 (30.3)
Object 89.4 (18.9) 80.3 (26.5)
Away 56.1 (26.0) 37.9 (31.4)
Note. Chance levels for own/other recognition and instruction recognition was 50% and 25%, resp.; total
number of trials for overall performance: n = 9; Own gaze: n = 6; Other gaze: n = 3; Fillers: n = 2.
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and g2p ¼ 0:13, and d = 0.80 and g2p ¼ 0:26 corresponding to small, medium, and large
effects, respectively. For nonparametric tests, r is reported as an effect size with r = .10,
r = .30, and r = .50 denoting small, medium, and large effects, respectively (Cohen,
1988).
2.2.1. Main analysis of performance
An overview of the data is provided in Table 1 (see also Fig. 2). One-sample t-tests
revealed that the dynamic condition performed above chance for both recognition tasks
(own/other recognition: t(21) = 2.90, p = .009, d = 0.63; instruction recognition:
t(21) = 12.43, p < .001, d = 2.66). The static condition only performed above chance for
the instruction recognition task, t(21) = 6.45, p < .001, d = 1.38, but not for the own/
other recognition task, t(21) = 1.73, p = .099, d = .36 (the Bonferroni adjusted signifi-
cance level given 2 comparisons per judgment task: a = 0.025).
Comparison of the static and dynamic conditions revealed that performance on the
own/other recognition task did not differ between the two conditions, t(42) = 0.39,
p = .696; d = 0.12, whereas the dynamic condition yielded better performance than the
static condition on the instruction recognition task, t(42) = 2.06, p = .046, d = 0.63. In
Fig. 2. Percentage of correct judgments in Experiment 1 for (a) own/other recognition task, and (b) instruc-
tion recognition task presented for both conditions and for own (n = 6) and other (n = 3) gaze trials. The
y-intercept represents chance level; error bars represent standard error of the mean.
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other words, dynamic replays seem to yield above chance performance on both recogni-
tion tasks and seem to enhance recognition of the instruction reflected in the gaze display
compared to static displays.
As shown in Table 1, with respect to recognizing a gaze display as someone else’s or
one’s own, participants in both conditions tended to be better in recognizing someone
else’s as someone else’s than at recognizing one’s own as one’s own (i.e., difference of
9.1%–9.8%). This difference was borderline significant when tested with a 2 (display con-
dition: static or dynamic) 9 2 (gaze: own or other) mixed factor ANOVA with percentage
correct on the own/other recognition task as dependent variable: F(1, 42) = 4.01,
p = .052, g2p ¼ 0:087. However, there was no main effect of condition nor an interaction
between display condition 9 gaze (both Fs < 1). When recognizing instructions from own
gaze trials and other gaze trials, it appears that in the dynamic condition, participants were
somewhat better in interpreting their own gaze displays than other gaze displays (differ-
ence of 9.1%), although this pattern was reversed for the static condition, with other gaze
displays yielding better performance than own gaze displays (i.e., difference of 3.0%). A 2
(display condition: static or dynamic) 9 2 (gaze: own or other) mixed ANOVA with percent-
age correct on the instruction recognition task as the dependent variable did not reveal any
effects (all ps ≥ .082). Note, however, that the number of observations in these analyses
was unbalanced in terms of own (n = 6) and other (n = 3), and that the number of “other”
observations was very low. As such, caution is warranted when interpreting these results.
2.2.2. Performance differences among instructions
As mentioned in the Introduction, two of the instructions could be expected to result in
many eye movements toward the faces of the depicted people (i.e., “ages” and “away”),
whereas one would lead to very little if focus is on the people (i.e., “objects”). One would
expect that this would make the “objects” gaze patterns more distinctive than the others,
which would make this instruction easier to recognize. To formally assess this, we explored
participants’ performance for each instruction condition separately. These data show that,
indeed, recognition performance on the “objects” instruction was much higher than on the
other two instructions (see also Table 1). This was confirmed by a 2 (display condition: sta-
tic or dynamic) 9 3 (instruction: away, ages or object) mixed-factor ANOVA with the correct
percentage as the dependent variable, which revealed a main effect of instruction: F(2,
84) = 37.40, p < .001, g2p ¼ 0:471 (note, however, the low number of observations per par-
ticipant for each instruction condition, n = 3). The Bonferroni correction follow-up analy-
ses confirmed that performance was best for the “object” instruction compared to the other
two instructions (both ps < .001) and that the “ages” instruction yielded a reliable better
performance than the “away” instructions (p = .029). In addition, a main effect of the
condition replicated the finding that the dynamic group outperformed the static group:
F(1, 42) = 4.23, p = .046, g2p ¼ 0:092. There was no interaction effect (F < 1).
2.2.3. Response times
In order to explore whether observers made a decision at first sight or took some time,
response times were analyzed.3 As can be seen in Table 2, observers in the dynamic
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condition tended to watch the whole dynamic replay of eye movements before deciding
on the recognition tasks. Indeed, mean response times in the static condition were shorter
for both judgments (t[42] = 4.45, p < .001, d = 1.37 and t[42] = 2.82, p = .007,
d = 0.87, respectively), but they still suggest that observers did not respond at first sight,
but rather inspected the gaze display at hand.
2.3. Conclusion
The aim of Experiment 1 was to explore whether participants who have just inspected
a painting under different instruction conditions would be able to recognize whether or
not a display of eye movements was their own and would be able to recognize which
instruction was reflected in the display. In line with our hypothesis, the data showed that
performance in the dynamic condition was above chance on both recognition test tasks,
while the static condition scored only above chance on the instruction recognition task
but not on the own/other recognition task. Note that the dynamic display condition did
not yield a better performance than the static condition on the own/other recognition task.
On the instruction recognition task, however, the dynamic condition did yield a better
performance than the static condition. This latter finding was true for all instruction con-
ditions, which underlines the importance of spatial-temporal information, which was
inherently provided in the dynamic replays, but not in the static displays. Finally, we
showed that the more distinctive gaze patterns, such as those derived from the “object”
instruction, were much easier to recognize.
3. Experiment 2
Although the results from Experiment 1 were promising in showing that participants
are able to recognize whether or not a gaze replay was their own or not and to meaning-
fully interpret dynamic and static displays of their own and other person’s eye move-
ments, performance on the own/other recognition task was only slightly above chance
and only so for the dynamic condition. One of the questions addressed in Experiment 2,
Table 2
Mean response times (SD) per condition and occurrences of response times lasting shorter/longer than 15 s
presentation time in Experiment 1
Dynamic Condition Static Condition
Mean (SD) response time for own/other task (s) 12.9 (3.7) 8.0 (3.6)
Mean (SD) total response time (s) 16.5 (4.0) 13.2 (3.5)
Occurrences of < 15 s and > 15 s response time
for own/other task (% RT > 15 s)
105/93 (47.0) 175/23 (11.6)
Occurrences of < 15 s and > 15 s response time
in total (% RT > 15 s)
73/125 (63.1) 134/64 (32.3)
Note. Fillers were excluded.
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therefore, was whether recognition performance would improve when participants are
informed about the judgment task prior to recording their eye movements. This might
make participants monitor their viewing behavior more consciously, which would be
expected to result in a stronger memory trace of their own scan paths, which, in turn,
would facilitate recognition.
This assumption was based on previous research that showed that participants were
able to consciously monitor their own viewing behavior and to recollect this information
(Marti et al., 2015). In their study, participants performed serial search tasks, after which
they had to introspect on where they had looked on the display. Results suggest that
although introspection was neither perfect (i.e., reported fixations were more on targets of
the display, whereas real fixations were closer to the center of the screen) nor complete
(i.e., about half of the real fixations could be matched to the reported fixations), partici-
pants were able to provide valid reports of their eye movements that were closely related,
spatially and temporally, to the real eye movements. In addition, participants tend to pro-
duce similar scanpaths during recognition as during earlier encoding of the same stimulus
(Foulsham & Kingstone, 2013a; Foulsham & Underwood, 2008; Valuch et al., 2013).
That is, when instructed to memorize multiple images for later recognition purposes, par-
ticipants tend to refixate earlier fixated regions during recognition, even if the original
image had been mirrored or shifted during recognition (Valuch et al., 2013). Importantly,
these similar-looking patterns are also observed when participants are instructed to “atten-
tively examine” the images without the purpose of later recognition (Valuch et al., 2013,
p. 4), but to a lesser extent. This might indicate that a stronger memory trace of the scan-
path is formed when participants know that recognition is required.
Although this study is very different, as we present only one image under different
instruction conditions rather than a vast number of images with one general instruction,
and our presentation duration is 3–5 times longer, it can be hypothesized based on these
findings that being informed about the subsequent recognition task would result in stron-
ger memory traces of one’s own scanpath. This should improve recognition performance
on the own/other recognition task, as well as the recognition of the instruction of one’s
own scanpaths. To examine this assumption, participants in Experiment 2 were assigned
to either an informed condition or a not informed condition. We hypothesized that partici-
pants in the informed condition would outperform participants in the not informed condi-
tion on the own/other recognition task and—at least for gaze displays that were their own
—on the instruction recognition task.
Moreover, Experiment 1 fell short in providing insight into how participants performed
the judgments with respect to their temporal unfolding, as well as the order in which
these judgments were made. After all, in Experiment 1 the questions were asked sequen-
tially with the own/other question always preceding the instruction question. As such, it
is unclear whether participants really make separate decisions and, if so, whether they
make them in this order, or whether they first recognize the instruction before recognizing
whether or not their own eye movements are displayed. In order to get an insight into this
matter, a think-aloud protocol was introduced in Experiment 2 (e.g., Ericsson & Simon,
1993; Van Gog et al., 2005). As such, participants were instructed to answer the
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recognition questions aloud, as soon as they knew the answer, without imposing an order.
This allows for determining how participants performed the judgments and provides some
information on the timing and order of their judgments.
Lastly, Experiment 1 was unbalanced in terms of “own” (each instruction presented
twice = 6 items) vs. “other” (each instruction presented once = 3 items) recognition
items. We therefore increased the number of “other” items in Experiment 2 by including
recordings from each instruction condition by a second other person.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
Participants were 106 Dutch undergraduate students (32 males, Mage = 20.6,
SD = 3.0), who had not participated in Experiment 1 and took part for course credit or a
monetary reward of 5 Euro. Twenty-nine additional participants (5 males; Mage = 21.2,
SD = 2.9) enrolled in the study but had to be excluded due to bad calibrations (i.e., devi-
ations ≥ 0.7°; n = 16), indicating during debriefing that they had forgotten about one or
more of the answering options on one or more of the trials (despite repetitive presentation
of the instructions in between trials, see below; n = 12) or technical problems (n = 1).
All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
3.1.2. Design
A 2 (display condition: static or dynamic) 9 2 (information condition: informed or not
informed) between-subjects design was used, resulting in four conditions to which partici-
pants were randomly assigned. The order in which the recognition tasks (i.e., own/other
recognition and instruction recognition) were presented to participants during recognition
task instruction was counterbalanced within each condition, both during verbal instruction
prior to the experiment and on screen in-between trials (this was done to ensure that the
order of presenting the instructions would not affect the think aloud recognition data). As
such, 27 participants in the dynamic condition were assigned to the informed condition
(of whom 13 received the order instruction recognition—own/other recognition), leaving
26 in the not-informed condition (of whom 13 received the order instruction recognition
—own/other recognition). In the static condition, 26 participants were assigned to the
informed condition (of whom 13 received order instruction recognition—own/other recog-
nition) and 27 to the not-informed condition (of whom 13 received order instruction
recognition—own/other recognition).
3.1.3. Materials
3.1.3.1. Stimulus and instructions: The same stimulus and instruction conditions (i.e.,
“ages”, “objects,” and “away”) were used as in Experiment 1. An additional image (i.e.,
Dutch government) was used in two practice trials and was presented to participants once
under one instruction condition (i.e., “Count the number of people and those who wear a
blue tie.”), followed by a practice recognition test to familiarize participants with the
think aloud method (see “practice task”).
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3.1.3.2. Gaze displays: The eye tracker and recording set-up was the same as in Experi-
ment 1 and the gaze displays were generated, using the same settings as in Experiment 1.
The “other” eye movement records covered each of the three experimental instructions
plus the two filler instructions and were generated by two different people: the same as in
Experiment 1, plus those from one other person, recorded prior to the experiment.
3.1.3.3. Recognition test: The recognition test consisted of 16 dynamic or static gaze dis-
plays, depending on the condition (i.e., the same as in Experiment 1, plus the five addi-
tional ones in the “other” condition). As in Experiment 1, gaze displays were presented
in random order on the computer screen, using E-Prime (Version 2.0; Psychology Soft-
ware Tools, Inc.), and each gaze display was presented for a maximum of 15 s.
Participants had to perform the same judgment tasks as in Experiment 1 (i.e., own/
other recognition and instruction recognition), but now participants were instructed to
provide their answers orally; that is, participants were asked to think aloud while watch-
ing the dynamic or static gaze display and to answer both questions: “Whose eye move-
ments were these? Were these your own or someone else’s? And which instruction is
reflected by the eye movements? Is that the instruction of judging the ages of the people
in the painting, remembering the positions of the objects in the room, estimating how
long the unexpected visitor had been away, or none of these instructions?”. As stated
above, the order within which the questions were presented was counterbalanced within
conditions. Participants were instructed to provide their judgments as fast and as accu-
rately as possible once they knew the answer to one or to both questions, and they were
allowed to provide their judgments after the display had turned black (i.e., after 15 s) if
they not yet had done so. Participants’ answers were recorded by a microphone attached
to the stimulus PC. In between the trials, a slide appeared on screen (for 10 s) that
reminded participants of both questions and answering options (in the same order as dur-
ing verbal instruction).
3.1.3.4. Practice task: A practice task was used to familiarize participants with thinking
aloud during the recognition test. Overlaid on the practice image, two “other” gaze dis-
plays were presented, one recorded under the same instruction that participants had car-
ried out themselves and a different one. The gaze display was either static or dynamic
depending on the condition. Participants were instructed to judge aloud whether their
own or someone else’s eye movements were displayed and whether the display reflected
the same instruction they had been presented with or not.
3.1.4. Procedure
Participants were seated in front of the monitor and were shown Ilya Repin’s The
Unexpected Visitor for free inspection (i.e., 15 s). Then, participants were instructed that
they would be presented with the image three more times under different instruction con-
ditions, while their eye movements were recorded. The informed group was then told that
they had to carefully follow each instruction while inspecting the image, because in the
second part of the experiment they would be shown their gaze displays and would be
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asked to judge which instruction a display reflected. The not informed group was told that
they had to carefully follow each instruction while inspecting the image, because their
eyes were being tracked (which was identical to the instruction in Experiment 1). Here-
after, participants were positioned in the head- and chinrest and the eye tracker was cali-
brated, using the same procedure as in Experiment 1 (after removal of participants who
deviated ≥ 0.7°: dynamic condition: accuracy M = 0.36°, SD = 0.12°; static condition:
accuracy M = 0.40°, SD = 0.13°), and the instruction conditions were presented in ran-
dom order. Finally, the additional practice image was presented under one instruction
condition. Subsequently, the experimenter generated the participant’s dynamic or static
gaze displays (i.e., n = 3), while participants performed a filler task (i.e., a puzzle) for
approximately 5 min. Participants then performed the practice task to familiarize them
with thinking aloud and subsequently performed the recognition test. Afterwards, partici-
pants were debriefed and asked whether they experienced any difficulties in performing
the task or remembering all answering options (and, if so, they were excluded from the
sample; see “Participants” section).
3.1.5. Data analysis
Analysis of performance data was similar as in Experiment 1, except that the experi-
menter kept track of the provided oral judgments during the course of the experiment.
3.1.5.1. Order of response: In order to assess whether participants had a preference for first
providing one judgment or the other in both the static and dynamic condition, we computed
the relative number of occasions on which they first provided their judgment for the own/
other recognition task. This was done by dividing the total number of instances on which
they first provided the judgment of the instruction task by the total number of trials (exclud-
ing the filler trials; n = 1,272). A value > 0.50 shows that the instruction recognition was
mentioned first, < 0.50 the own/other recognition was mentioned first, and at 0.50 both are
mentioned first equally often. Subsequently, separate one-sample t-tests were conducted for
each condition to assess whether the proportion of answering the own/other recognition task
first differed significantly from chance (i.e., 0.50).
3.1.5.2. Response times: An independent rater scored the response times with respect to
both judgment tasks (i.e., onset and end of first judgment and onset of second judgment). A
second independent rater scored a subset of the data (i.e., 10%); Intra Class Correlation was
high (ICC’s ≥ 0.990). Responses for the filler trials were not included in the analyses. Addi-
tionally, a total of 20 responses (i.e., 1.6%) had to be excluded due to participants taking
too much time for providing their judgments (> 30 s with the display turning black after
15 s, n = 7), correcting their judgments or making comments (because this rendered it
unclear which onset to use in the analyses; n = 5), or forgetting to provide a judgment (i.e.,
the experimenter reminded him/her to do so; n = 8), leaving a total of 1,252 responses.
Response times were used to determine when both judgments were provided and the
time interval between the judgments. Subsequently, the interval between judgments was
either categorized as short (i.e., interval between judgments < 500 ms), moderate (500–
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1,000 ms), or long (> 1,000 ms; see Boomer & Dittmann, 1962; Rochester, 1973). We
then explored whether performance (i.e., both judgments correct, one judgment correct,
or both judgments incorrect) was associated with short, moderate, or long intervals, to get
an indication of whether the two recognition decisions are integrated (short intervals) or
separate (moderate and long intervals) decisions.
3.2. Results and discussion
3.2.1. Main analysis of performance
An overview of the data is provided in Table 3 (see also Fig. 3). One-sample t-tests
(Bonferroni adjusted a = 0.0125) revealed that the dynamic conditions performed above
chance for the own/other recognition task (informed: t[25] = 4.23, p < .001, d = .83; not
informed: t[25] = 3.45, p = .002, d = 0.67), but that the static conditions did not (in-
formed: t[24] = 2.53, p = .018, d = 0.51; not informed: t[25] = 2.27, p = .032, d = 0.44;
note that this is not significant after correction of the alpha).4 A univariate ANOVA with dis-
play condition (dynamic or static) and information condition (informed or not informed)
as between-subjects variables and performance as dependent variable revealed neither
main effects (display condition: F[1, 99] = 3.056, p = .084, g2p ¼ 0:030, information con-
dition: F < 1), nor an interaction effect (F < 1). Overall, our findings replicated those
from Experiment 1 in that participants only performed better than chance at making own/
other recognition judgments with dynamic gaze displays, but not with static gaze displays.
For the instruction recognition task, one-sample t-tests (Bonferroni adjusted
a = 0.0125) revealed that performance was above chance irrespective of display condition
or information condition (dynamic/informed: t[26] = 15.40, p < .001, d = 2.96; dynamic/
not informed: t[25] = 13.32, p < .001, d = 2.61; static/informed: t[25] = 12.56, p < .001,
d = 2.47; static/not informed: t[26] = 10.60, p < .001, d = 2.04). A univariate ANOVA with
display condition (dynamic or static) and information condition (informed or not
informed) as between-subjects variables and performance as dependent variable only
revealed a significant main effect of the display condition, F(1, 102) = 8.51, p = .004,
g2p ¼ 0:077, but no main effect of information condition (F < 1) and no interaction effect
(F < 1). The main effect of the display condition replicated the finding from Experiment
1, in that the dynamic group outperformed the static group on the instruction recognition
task. However, being informed about the subsequent judgment task did not result in any
improvements (or decrements) in the performance.
In sum, no evidence was found that informing participants about the subsequent judg-
ment task led to higher recognition performances. When comparing performance on own
versus other gaze trials (see Table 3), no such advantage was observed either: A 2 (dis-
play condition: static or dynamic) 9 2 (information condition: informed or not informed)
9 2 (gaze: own or other) mixed-factor ANOVA on percentage correct on the own/other
recognition task did not reveal any main or interaction effects (gaze: F[1, 102] = 3.58,
p = .061, g2p ¼ 0:34; display condition: F[1, 102] = 3.62, p = .060, g2p ¼ 0:34; informa-
tion condition: F < 1; all interactions: Fs[1, 102] ≤ 1.27, ps ≥ 0.262, g2ps ¼ 0:012). The
same applied to the instruction recognition task: A mixed-factor ANOVA on percentage
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correct on the instruction recognition task only revealed the main effect of display condi-
tion (F[1, 102] = 8.51, p = .004, g2p ¼ 0:077), with the dynamic condition yielding a bet-
ter performance than the static condition, but no other effects (all Fs < 1). Since we did
not find any effects of being informed on performance, either overall or when distinguish-
ing between own and other trials, the data of information conditions will collapse within
each display condition in subsequent analyses.
3.2.2. Performance differences among instructions
In order to replicate the findings of Experiment 1, we assessed performance on each
instruction task separately. Consistent with Experiment 1, the data revealed that perfor-
mance on the “objects” instruction was much higher than on the other two instructions
(see Table 3). This was confirmed by a 2 (display condition: dynamic or static) 9 3 (in-
struction: ages, away or objects) mixed-factor ANOVA with percentage correct as the
dependent variable, which showed, next to the main effect of condition (F[1,
104] = 8.59, p < .001, g2p ¼ 0:076; dynamic > static), a main effect of instruction (F[2,
208] = 72.48; p < .001, g2p ¼ 0:411), but no interaction effect (F[2, 208] = 1.68,
p = .190, g2p ¼ 0:016). Bonferroni-corrected follow-up comparisons on instruction
revealed that the “objects” instruction yielded better performance (both ps < .001) than
the other two instructions, for which performance did not differ (p = 1.000).
3.2.3. Analysis of response sequence
To assess whether or not participants had a preference for first making one judg-
ment or the other, we conducted one-sample t-tests (Bonferroni adjusted a = 0.025)
Table 3
Mean percentage (SD) of correct responses for both recognition tasks per condition and as function of
whether the gaze replay was a participant’s own or someone else’s, and performance on each instruction con-
dition in Experiment 2
Dynamic Condition Static Condition
Informed Not Informed Informed Not Informed
Own/other recognition 60.8 (13.6) 62.2 (18.1) 56.1 (12.8) 55.6 (16.2)
Own gaze 62.4 (23.4) 58.3 (23.7) 51.9 (22.8) 50.6 (25.5)
Other gaze 59.3 (20.3) 66.0 (22.8) 60.3 (17.7) 60.5 (16.8)
Fillers 84.3 (24.2) 88.5 (14.5) 85.6 (16.1) 83.3 (19.6)
d’ 0.63 (0.76) 0.68 (1.01) 0.36 (0.71) 0.37 (0.84)
Instruction recognition 66.7 (14.1) 69.9 (17.2) 60.6 (14.4) 58.3 (16.3)
Own gaze 64.2 (24.8) 71.8 (24.4) 63.5 (25.4) 60.5 (25.8)
Other gaze 69.1 (17.7) 67.9 (18.8) 57.7 (20.1) 56.2 (16.8)
Fillers 38.0 (32.1) 38.5 (29.4) 32.7 (24.3) 38.0 (22.3)
Age 55.6 (18.8) 56.7 (25.1) 51.0 (21.8) 52.8 (26.3)
Object 86.1 (20.0) 89.4 (18.9) 81.7 (20.7) 78.7 (21.6)
Away 58.3 (26.9) 63.5 (28.5) 49.0 (22.9) 43.5 (25.6)
Note. Chance levels for own/other recognition and instruction recognition was 50% and 25%, resp.; total
number of trials for overall performance: n = 12; Own gaze: n = 6; Other gaze: n = 6; Fillers: n = 4.
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for both display conditions (dynamic or static) with the relative number of occasions
in which they first provided their judgment of the instruction recognition task as the
dependent variable. These analyses revealed that participants in the dynamic condition
were more inclined to first provide the instruction judgment and then the own/other
judgment (Minstruction = 0.64, SD = .41; t(52) = 2.59, p = .013, d = 0.36). In the static
condition, this preference was not statistically significant (Minstruction = 0.61, SD = 0.42,
t(52) = 1.87, p = .067, d = 0.26). This preference for first providing the instruction
judgment, at least in the dynamic condition, resonates well with the finding that it
was harder to recognize whether or not a gaze display was one’s own than to recog-
nize the instruction reflected in a gaze display, as evidenced by performance on the
recognition tasks.
Fig. 3. Percentage of correct judgments in Experiment 2 for (a) own/other recognition task, and (b) instruc-
tion recognition task presented for each display condition and information condition and for own (n = 6) and
other (n = 6) gaze trials. The y-intercept represents chance level; error bars represent standard error of the
mean.
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3.2.4. Response times and timing of judgments
An overview of the response times is provided in Table 4. The pattern of the response
times is similar to the pattern observed in Experiment 1; that is, participants in the
dynamic condition took more time to provide both judgments than participants in the sta-
tic condition (1st judgment: U = 317.00, z = 6.872, p < .001, r = .67; 2nd judgment:
U = 443.00, z = 6.075, p < .001, r = .59). When comparing the response times to the
ones in Experiment 1, it appears that participants were considerably faster in the current
experiment (i.e., approximately 3–5 s on average), which might be due to the changes in
the procedure (i.e., think-aloud response, resolving the need to move the eyes away from
the display toward the numeric keyboard, and the opportunity to provide the judgments
in any order). In line with this observation, the occurrences in which participants took
more time to make their decision than the presentation time of the gaze display of 15 s
was considerably lower (i.e., dynamic: 28.0%; static: 5.1%) than in Experiment 1 (i.e.,
dynamic: 67.1%; static: 30.7%).
With regard to time intervals between judgments, which can be used to explore
whether the two judgments were likely made in one integrated manner or separately,
there was a similar pattern for the dynamic and static conditions: 33.2–34.4% judgment
intervals were short (< 500 ms), 15.8–16.9% were moderate (500–1,000 ms), and 49.8–
49.9% were long (> 1,000 ms). In addition, we explored whether short intervals were
more often associated with correct answers than long intervals by computing the frequen-
cies for both correct, only one judgment correct, or both judgments incorrect for each
interval. This did not reveal a systematic trend, but rather it showed that for the dynamic
condition only 34.1% of the cases in which both judgments were correct had a short
interval, 18.1% a moderate interval, and 47.8% a long interval. The same was true for
the static condition (i.e., 30.4%, 18.5%, and 51.1%, resp.). Hence, making one integrated
decision (as reflected in a short time interval) was not unambiguously associated with the
judgments being correct, nor was making separate decisions (as reflected in long inter-
vals) unequivocally associated with having both judgments incorrect (i.e., only 14.5%
[dynamic condition] to 17.9% [static condition] of the cases in which both judgments
Table 4
Mean response times (SD) per condition, occurrences of response times lasting shorter/longer than 15 s pre-
sentation time, and mean inter-response interval (SD) for each condition in Experiment 2
Dynamic Condition Static Condition
Informed Not Informed Informed Not Informed
Mean (SD) response time for 1st judgment (s) 9.3 (4.1) 8.9 (3.3) 5.1 (2.9) 4.7 (2.8)
Mean (SD) total response time (s) 12.4 (4.4) 11.9 (3.3) 8.0 (3.1) 7.9 (2.9)
Occurrences of < 15 s and > 15 s response
time for 1st judgment (% RT > 15 s)
257/61 (19.2) 261/46 (15.0) 293/12 (3.9) 310/12 (3.7)
Occurrences of < 15 s and > 15 s response
time in total (% RT > 15 s)
224/94 (29.6) 224/83 (27.0) 289/16 (5.2) 306/16 (5.0)
Inter-response Interval (s) 1.61 (0.82) 1.46 (0.77)
Note. Fillers were excluded.
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were incorrect had a long interval between the judgments). In sum, participants seemed
to make an integrated decision on approximately one-third of the trials, but a separate
decision on at least half of the trials, and this was not associated with correctness. The
time interval between judgments might, however, be associated with participants’ confi-
dence in the correctness of their decisions (i.e., when an answer comes to the mind flu-
ently, people tend to be more confident in its correctness; e.g., Ackerman & Zalmanov,
2012). This we did not assess, but it might be interesting to take into account in future
research.
3.3. Conclusion
In line with the findings from Experiment 1, recognition of whether a gaze display was
or was not one’s own was above chance only for the dynamic condition, but not for the
static condition. However, as in Experiment 1, the dynamic condition did not yield better
performance than the static condition on the own/other recognition task. Moreover, the
dynamic group outperformed the static group in interpreting which instruction was
reflected in the gaze displays, with both groups performing well above chance in both
conditions. The findings of Experiment 2 extend those of Experiment 1 by providing
insight into how participants performed the task. Using a think-aloud method, it was
revealed that participants had a preference for first providing the instruction judgment,
although this preference was only significantly different from chance in the dynamic con-
dition. Note that the think-aloud method only resulted in participants providing their judg-
ment (e.g., “This is objects, and . . . mine”); it did not yield any information on how they
came to that judgment. This might be due to the limited time of the stimulus presentation,
which was clearly long enough to perform the tasks, but might have been too short to
provide an elaborate justification of why they chose a particular instruction condition or
of why they thought it was or was not their own gaze display.
Next to replicating and extending the findings from Experiment 1, a second aim of
Experiment 2 was to uncover whether being informed about the subsequent judgment task
would improve recognition performance. Contrary to our predictions, however, no bene-
fits of being informed were found. This suggests that participants did not strategically
change their viewing behavior to facilitate later judgments when they knew in advance
about the judgment tasks. This is in line with findings by Marti et al. (2015), who found
that participants were quite good at introspection, but knowing that they would have to
introspect, did not result in fundamentally different eye movement patterns compared to
participants who were not instructed to introspect.
4. Experiment 3
Experiments 1 and 2 showed that the dynamic condition resulted in better instruction
recognition performance than the static condition, presumably because the dynamic condi-
tion inherently provided spatial-temporal information, which was only limitedly available
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in the static displays. That is, whereas the dynamic condition inherently provided infor-
mation of what was inspected and in what order, this information was present only to
some degree in the static condition by the connecting lines between two consecutive fixa-
tions. To investigate the role of order information for instruction recognition performance,
we conducted a third experiment in which we compared three different display types:
(a) dynamic displays (i.e., exact order information); (b) static with lines between consecu-
tive fixations (i.e., some but limited order information); and (c) static displays without
lines between consecutive fixations (i.e., no order information). In all displays, temporal
information was provided by displaying relative fixation duration (i.e., smaller circles for
shorter fixations, larger circles for longer fixations) to eliminate any positive effects of
being provided with temporal information in the dynamic condition and not in the static
conditions.
In line with the findings from Experiments 1 and 2, we hypothesized that the dynamic
condition would yield higher performance than the two static conditions. In addition, we
expected that being provided with some information about the order of fixations in the
static display would lead to better performance than not having any order information
available, especially for the “away” instruction for which the (limited) order information
is important to distinguish it from the “ages” instruction (i.e., both yield many fixations
on the faces but differ in the amount of switching between faces; see also DeAngelus &
Pelz, 2009). Hence, it is expected that performance on these instructions is worst for the
static without order information compared to the static with limited order information and
dynamic display conditions. As we now were only interested in interpreting another per-
son’s eye movements in terms of the task instruction, this third experiment was conducted
online via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010).
4.1. Method
4.1.1. Participants and design
Participants (n = 60) were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (see Paolacci
et al., 2010) and were paid a small incentive for their participation ($2). Three partici-
pants had to be excluded due to incomplete data (n = 1) or due to technical difficulties
(n = 2). The remaining 57 participants (Mage = 38.8 years, SD = 12.3 years, range 19–
71 years; 29 males) were U.S. residents, performed the study on a laptop or computer in
an environment without distractions (i.e., self-reported noise rating lower than seven on a
scale of one to nine), and were not color blind.
A within-subjects design was employed, so all participants performed the instruction
recognition task under each display condition. Order of display conditions was counter-
balanced across participants.
4.1.2. Materials
4.1.2.1. Gaze displays: Gaze displays were presented in Qualtrics software (Qualtrics,
Provo, UT, USA). They were generated using the data of the five participants with the
highest calibration accuracy in Experiment 1. SMI BeGaze software (Version 3.4;
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SensoMotoric Instruments) was used to generate the displays for three instruction condi-
tions (i.e., “ages,” “away,” and “objects”). For each of these five participants and each
instruction condition, three gaze displays were generated (one for each display condition),
yielding 45 different gaze displays. The static and dynamic displays of eye movements
were generated using the “Scan Path” utility in BeGaze, with fixations defined as lasting
at least 100 ms with a maximal dispersion of 50 pixels. Fixations were displayed as yel-
low circles with a line width of 4 pixels. Size varied depending on duration of the fixa-
tion (e.g., the diameter of a fixation of 500 ms was 80 pixels). In the static displays with
order information, consecutive fixations were connected by a yellow solid line (4 pixels).
In the dynamic displays and the static displays without order information, no lines
between fixations were visible (i.e., no gaze trail). See Fig. 4 for screenshots of the dif-
ferent gaze displays.
4.1.2.2. Recognition test: The recognition test consisted of three blocks of 15 gaze
displays for each display condition, consisting of five times each instruction condi-
tion. Within each display condition, gaze displays were presented randomly and each
gaze display was presented for a maximum of 15 s. Participants were instructed to
judge which instruction is reflected in the gaze displays shown to them, by inspect-
ing the image and then proceeding to the next page (either manually by clicking the
next page button or automatically after 15 s) and providing the answer by selecting
one of the three instruction conditions. Prior to each gaze display, participants were
reminded of the question and answering options, which remained on screen for a
maximum of 10 s, after which the system automatically proceeded to the next page
or shorter, when participants proceeded to the next page earlier by clicking on the
next-page button.
4.1.3. Procedure
After logging on to the system, participants were asked to fill out some demographic
questions. As in Experiments 1 and 2, they then were provided with Ilya Repin’s The
Unexpected Visitor for free inspection (i.e., 15 s). Then, participants were instructed that
they would be presented with the image three more times under different instruction con-
ditions and that they had to carefully follow each instruction while inspecting the image.
Participants then performed the recognition test in three blocks of 15 displays. The entire
experiment lasted approximately 30 min.
4.1.4. Data analysis
Analysis of performance data was similar as in Experiment 1: For each display condi-
tion, a one-sample t-test was used to assess whether performance was above chance (i.e.,
number correct judgments > chance [i.e., 33.33%]). A repeated measures analysis of vari-
ance (RM-ANOVA) was used to analyze differences in performance with the three display
conditions and instruction conditions as within-subjects factors. Helmert contrasts were
applied to test our first hypothesis that the dynamic condition would yield higher recogni-
tion performance than the two static conditions and to test our second hypothesis that the
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static condition with limited order information would yield higher performance than the
static condition without order information.
4.2. Results and discussion
An overview of the data is provided in Table 5. One-sample t-tests (Bonferroni
adjusted a = 0.017) revealed that all conditions performed above chance in recognizing
what instruction was reflected in the gaze displays (dynamic: t[56] = 19.11, p < .001,
d = 2.53; static with limited order information: t[56] = 18.79, p < .001, d = 2.49; static
without order information: t[56] = 17.23, p < .001, d = 2.28).
To assess whether there were any differences in performance as a result of display
condition and instruction, a 3 (display condition: dynamic, static with limited order infor-
mation, static without order information) by 3 (instruction: ages, objects, away) repeated
measures analysis of variance was conducted with planned Helmert contrasts to test our
hypotheses. This analysis revealed a main effect of display condition: F(2, 112) = 4.23,
p = .017, g2p ¼ 0:070. The planned Helmert contrasts confirmed our first hypothesis that
the dynamic condition would yield higher performance than the two static conditions:
F(1, 56) = 6.47, p = .014, g2p ¼ 0:104, but not our second hypothesis that the static con-
dition with limited order information would yield higher performance than the static con-
dition without order information: F(1, 56) = 1.43, p = .237, g2p ¼ 0:025. In addition, a
main effect of instruction was revealed: F(2, 112) = 103.72, p < .001, g2p ¼ 0:649. Bon-
ferroni post hoc comparisons revealed that participants performed significantly better on
the “objects” instruction than on the “ages” and “away” instructions (both p’s < .001).
Performance on the “ages” and “away” instructions did not differ significantly (p = .110).
These main effects were qualified by a significant interaction between display condition
and instruction: F(4, 224) = 5.15, p = .001, g2p ¼ 0:084. We further analyzed this interac-
tion by testing whether performance in the display conditions differed for each
Dynamic 
(with exact order information)
Static with limited order 
information
Static without order 
information
Fig. 4. Screenshots of the different displays in response to the “age” instruction condition presented in
Experiment 3. From left to right: dynamic gaze display, static gaze display with limited order information,
and static gaze display without order information.
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instruction. The planned Helmert contrasts revealed that performance differed between
display conditions only for the “away” instruction, with the dynamic condition (i.e., exact
order information) yielding higher performance than the static conditions,
F(1, 56) = 11.77, p = .001, g2p ¼ 0:174, and the static condition with limited order infor-
mation yielding better performance than the static condition without order information,
F(4, 224) = 7.49, p = .008, g2p ¼ 0:118. On the “ages” and “objects” instructions, there
were no significant performance differences among conditions (all p’s ≥ .102).
4.3. Conclusion
The aim of this third experiment was to investigate the role of order information in
instruction recognition by comparing display conditions that provide exact, limited, or no
order information. Overall, the main effect of display condition seemed to indicate that
— in line with our hypothesis — the dynamic condition (exact order information) had
higher instruction recognition performance than the static conditions, but in contrast to
our hypothesis, the limited order information present in the static condition with connect-
ing lines did not yield higher overall performance than the static condition without order
information. However, these findings were qualified by an interaction with instruction: As
expected, benefits of order information were especially apparent for the “away” instruc-
tion. Only on this instruction did the dynamic condition significantly outperform the static
conditions and did the static condition with limited order information outperform the sta-
tic condition without order information.
5. General discussion
The aim of Experiments 1 and 2 was to investigate observers’ ability to recognize
whether a static or dynamic gaze display was their own or someone else’s and to inter-
pret which viewing instruction was reflected in these gaze displays, and whether being
informed about these tasks beforehand would lead to increased performance on these
tasks (Experiment 2). Both experiments showed that observers were only able to recog-
nize whether a gaze display was their own or someone else’s above chance level when
they were shown dynamic replays, not when they were shown static displays, though
Table 5
Mean percentage (SD) of performance on each instruction condition in Experiment 3
Dynamic Condition
With Exact Order
Information
Static Condition With
Limited Order
Information
Static Condition Without
Order Information
Overall performance 70.9 (14.8) 67.6 (13.8) 65.5 (14.1)
Age 63.5 (24.8) 57.2 (23.4) 58.9 (24.3)
Object 88.1 (18.5) 91.2 (15.1) 91.9 (16.0)
Away 61.1 (25.5) 54.4 (24.4) 45.6 (21.0)
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there were no significant differences in performance between the static and dynamic con-
ditions. Moreover, both experiments showed that observers could interpret (i.e., match the
corresponding instruction to) both static and dynamic gaze displays above chance level,
with dynamic displays yielding better performance than static displays. Being informed
beforehand about the instruction recognition task (Experiment 2) did—rather surprisingly
—not affect performance on either the own/other or the instruction recognition task.
In Experiment 3, we investigated the role of order information in instruction recogni-
tion, by comparing exact (i.e., dynamic displays), limited (i.e., static displays with con-
necting lines between fixations), and no order information (i.e. static displays without
connecting lines). Order information only helped recognition for one type of instruction:
Recognition performance on the “away” instruction was highest in the dynamic condition
and was higher in the static condition with connecting lines (limited order information)
than in the static condition without order information.
5.1. Distinguishing your own from another’s gaze displays
The first finding that for static displays recognition of whether a gaze display was
one’s own or another person’s was not above chance is consistent with previous studies
(Foulsham & Kingstone, 2013b). Although performance was consistently above chance
when using dynamic displays, the dynamic condition did not yield higher performance
than the static condition on this own/other recognition task. Indeed, it is rather surprising
that the temporal unfolding inherent in dynamic replays did not seem to foster recognition
of the one’s own eye movements as one’s own, even when the participants were informed
about the judgment task prior to eye movement recordings. Possibly, the instructions used
in this study resulted in highly similar scanpaths of self and “others.” In that case, it
would be hard for participants to recognize the difference, as the other displays would
also provide good memory cues. The finding that being informed did not result in any
performance benefits is in line with recent observations suggesting that people’s aware-
ness of where they have looked is poor (Clarke, Mahon, Irvine, & Hunt, 2016; V~o,
Aizenman, & Wolfe, 2016) but seems to be in contrast with the findings of Marti et al.
(2015), who reported that participants were able to consciously monitor their viewing
behavior and recollect and report on this information (note that the eye movement pat-
terns did not differ fundamentally when introspection was and was not required). How-
ever, our study differs from the Marti et al. study, in which participants provided reports
about their viewing behavior directly after completing a serial search, in two respects.
First, our participants had to recognize whether an eye movement pattern was theirs,
which might ask for a different recollection of information as compared to actively recon-
structing one’s own scan path. Second, in this study, participants had to retain informa-
tion on where they had looked for a longer period of time, as the recognition test was
presented only after they had inspected the image under each instruction condition. Thus,
taken together, it seems that memory of one’s own viewing behavior is short-lived, mak-
ing recollection of this information at a later stage difficult (which would be in line with
previous accounts on the validity of introspection; e.g., Ericsson & Simon, 1980).
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5.2. Interpreting gaze displays in terms of cognitive processes
The finding that participants performed above chance in both the static and dynamic
conditions at recognizing which instruction condition was reflected in the displays, con-
trasts with the findings by Greene et al. (2012), who suggested that observers were unable
to infer a person’s task based on a static gaze display. Possibly, this is due to the fact that
our instructions were a selection of three of Yarbus’s (1967) original instructions, one of
which we could reasonably expect to stand out from the other two (i.e., “objects”),
whereas we could expect the other two to partially overlap in terms of the areas fixated,
but not in the order of fixations (i.e., “ages” and “away”; DeAngelus & Pelz, 2009). In
the Greene et al. study, it was unclear whether the various instructions would yield a dis-
tinct gaze pattern on the various images that they used (see Borji & Itti, 2014).
Tentative evidence that the distinctiveness of gaze patterns in response to the different
instructions plays a role in recognition performance comes from the difference in perfor-
mance among instructions. The “objects” instruction, which distinguishes itself from the
other two in that it requires little if any focus on people, resulted in much higher recogni-
tion performance than the other two instructions, which bore more resemblance to each
other and often were confused with one another (see Table A1 in the Appendix). How-
ever, resemblance among instructions seemed to have more deleterious effects on instruc-
tion recognition performance in the static than in the dynamic condition in all
experiments. Overall, we found an advantage of dynamic over static displays with regard
to instruction recognition. This advantage seemed most apparent in the “away” instruction
(see Tables 1, 3, and 5), which differs from the “ages” instruction mainly in terms of
transitions between the faces of people depicted in the painting (see DeAngelus & Pelz,
2009). This is not surprising because the dynamic gaze displays inherently provide tem-
poral and spatial information with regard to transitions. The importance of order informa-
tion was underlined by the findings from Experiment 3, which showed that the exact
order information (dynamic displays) and limited order information (static displays with
connecting lines) was only helpful (compared to static displays with no order informa-
tion) for recognition performance on the “away” instruction, presumably because the
exact and limited order information highlighted the transitions between the faces of the
people in the picture.
These differences in people’s ability to reliably recognize the task instruction from a
given scanpath, but struggle to identify one’s own scanpath from someone else’s, can be
reconciled when considering the scale of the variability in eye movement patterns across
tasks compared to the variability across individuals (Litchfield et al., 2010). Litchfield
et al. argued that the variability in task-specific eye movements dwarfs the variability in
the eye movements across individuals performing the same task and therefore the task-
specificity of eye movements would be a major contributing factor as to how well gaze
displays could be intepretated (and exploited). In their study, observers could benefit from
viewing another person’s eye movement patterns but gained little advantage in watching
an expert over a novice performing the same task. Moreover, the beneficial effects in per-
formance were eliminated if the eye movements shown were not task-specific. It is well
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established that expert and novice eye movement behaviors are statistically different from
each other (for a meta analysis, see Gegenfurtner, Lehtinen, & S€alj€o, 2011), but this is
not apparent when the eye movement patterns are actually observed as gaze displays.
Instead, eye movements need to be substantially different from each other (i.e., coming
from a different task) to lead to differential effects on performance.
Unlike Litchfield et al. (2010), this study explicitly tested how well people can recog-
nize these recorded eye movement patterns. As mentioned earlier, the task instructions
may have resulted in observers producing highly similar scanpaths for each instruction
and so it was always going to be difficult to differentiate one scanpath from another when
the task is held constant. In contrast, different task instructions yield distinct gaze patterns
(DeAngelus & Pelz, 2009; Land, 2006; Yarbus, 1967), and so it follows that observers
would find it easier to recognize task instructions from scanpaths.
5.3. Limitations and future research
While the restriction to a single picture and just three carefully chosen instructions can
be regarded as a limitation of this study, we felt that this was a good starting point for
addressing our research questions, considering the lack of evidence for people’s ability to
meaningfully interpret gaze displays thus far (Greene et al., 2012). Yet future research
should address these questions, using other stimulus materials.
Another limitation is the rather limited number of observations in each cell (i.e., nine
observations in Experiments 1 and 16 in Experiment 2), which results in a rather large
variability in our signal detection measure d’. Hence, future research including more
observations should replicate the finding that recognition of whether a gaze display is
one’s own or another person’s is above chance for dynamic but not for static displays.
In addition, the current findings leave the question unanswered of how a display of eye
movements is encoded and whether participants attempt to compare it with the episodic
memory of where they looked under each instruction condition. Although we used a
think-aloud method in Experiment 2, it did not provide much information on how people
interpreted or processed the displays, presumably because of the limited presentation time
(15 s). Findings from standardized memory recognition tasks may shed light on this com-
plicated issue. For example, research by Gallo (2004) and Gallo, Bell, Beier, and Schacter
(2006) suggests that the presence of specific information can be used as a disqualifying
criterion as to whether an event is believed to have actually occurred. In our case, partici-
pants may identify a specific feature or features of the display that helps them distinguish
the task instruction associated with it and/or whether it was their own. For instance, if the
“other” eye movement recording showed fixations on an area that the participant con-
sciously remembers never having looked at, this would be a criterion for rejecting it as
being their own eye movement recording and as reflecting one of the three viewing
instructions. In addition to, and separate from disqualifying monitoring processes, Gallo
et al. suggest that the absence of specific information can be exploited by diagnostic
monitoring processes, which compare recollected information with that which is expected
to be recollected (i.e., recalling that one has looked at a certain area under a certain
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instruction condition, but the eye movement pattern not showing a fixation at that particu-
lar area). As the present study did not provide information on this matter, future research
in gaze interpretation could address this, for instance, by interviewing participants about
why they thought a display was their own or not, or reflected one instruction and not
another. In addition, in order to get insight into what information participants exploit in
making their judgments, future research might manipulate the duration of the gaze dis-
plays or number of visible fixations to see whether or not this affects performance.
Another way of making further progress in this regard would be to systematically
investigate the inferences that participants can make from recorded eye movement pat-
terns, given what we already know about how eye gaze is used in face-to-face situations
(Argyle & Cook, 1976; Kleinke, 1986; Shepherd, 2010), and the extent to which people
can infer what other people are thinking (e.g., Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Baron-Cohen,
1995; Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, & Bodley Scott, 2010). For example, it is
well established that we have a predisposition to process and follow eye gaze from a
face; however, understanding why another person was looking at a particular item can
involve relatively simple intentionality processes (e.g., Baron-Cohen’s intentionality
detector) or more advanced “theory-of-mind” processes that help the observer take the
perspective of others in more complex situations. The question is still open whether these
same processes are also being recruited to help recognize and interpret recorded gaze pat-
terns (cf. Litchfield et al., 2010). The fact that observers can regulate their own gaze dis-
plays to help or deceive observers depending on the sociocommunicative context
(Foulsham & Lock, 2014; see also Brennan, Chen, Dickinson, Neider, & Zelinsky, 2008)
suggests that there may be some overlap in processes and strategies employed in normal
face-to-face situations, but clearly further research is required that makes specific compar-
isons to face-to-face gaze interpretation abilities. Previous gaze display interpretation
studies (e.g., Foulsham & Lock, 2014; Greene et al., 2012; Zelinsky et al., 2013) have
required observers to make either relatively simple inferences or more complex inferences
about these gaze displays, with varying degrees of success. This study adds to this grow-
ing research area by showing that observers can recognize task instructions from these
gaze displays but struggle to recognize which gaze display is their own, and that these
respective abilities are affected by the type of display used (dynamic, static).
To conclude, we found that observers have difficulty recognizing whether a gaze dis-
play (static or dynamic) is their own or someone else’s. On dynamic gaze replays own/
other recognition performance was above chance, but performance differences between
static and dynamic displays were not significant. In contrast, we found that observers are
quite good at correctly identifying which task the viewer was performing from a gaze
pattern, at least from the small selection of three instructions used in this study. Instruc-
tion recognition was facilitated by dynamic gaze displays compared to static gaze dis-
plays in the first two experiments, and the third experiment showed this is likely due to
the order information that is inherently present in the dynamic displays. Order informa-
tion was especially relevant for distinguishing instructions that result in similar fixation
locations, but differ in the transitions among locations. In order to more fully understand
under what conditions observers are able to make inferences about eye movement
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displays, what kind of inferences they can make, and how this is achieved, future
research should further explore the role of task complexity and distinctiveness of eye
movement displays on inference making.
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Notes
1. In order to calculate d’ for the gaze recognition task, we applied the following
matrix:
Response Category Correct Answer Provided Answer
Hit Own Own
False negative Own Other
False positive Other Own
Correct rejection Other Other
2. Note that when d’ > 0, participants managed to correctly recognize whether a gaze
display was their own or someone else’s; that is, they had high hit/correct rejection
rates and low rates of false negatives/positives. On the contrary, d’ < 0 indicates
that participants consistently recognized their own gaze display as someone else’s
and vice versa; that is, they had low hit/correct rejection rates and high rates of
false negatives/positives. A d’ = 0 indicates performance at chance level with hit/
correct rejection rates being equal to rates of false negatives/positives (MacMillan
& Creelman, 2005).
3. Note that all responses were included; however, the results are the same when
excluding incorrect responses.
4. Note that we could not compute a d’ for three participants as the hit rate was zero
for two participants and for one participant the rate of false positives was = 1.
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Appendix
Table A1. Response matrix for all trials
Given Response
Instruction Condition Ages Away Objects None
Experiment 1 Static Ages 35 27 0 4
Objects 3 2 53 8
Away 31 25 0 10
Filler 4 13 14 13
Dynamic Ages 42 17 1 6
Objects 0 3 59 4
Away 19 37 3 7
Filler 7 6 16 15
Experiment 2 Static—Informed Ages 53 42 0 9
Objects 0 0 85 44
Away 42 51 6 17
Filler 9 11 13 34
Static—Not informed Ages 57 39 3 8
Objects 0 3 85 45
Away 41 47 0 14
Filler 10 19 20 41
Dynamic—Informed Ages 60 36 0 12
Objects 6 2 93 7
Away 33 63 1 11
Filler 14 14 39 41
Dynamic—Not informed Ages 59 40 0 5
Objects 2 1 93 8
Away 31 66 0 7
Filler 12 13 39 40
Experiment 3 Static without order
information
Ages 168 111 6
Objects 11 12 262
Away 139 130 16
Static with limited order
information
Ages 163 112 10
Objects 8 17 260
Away 117 155 13
Dynamic (exact order
information)
Ages 181 99 5
Objects 17 17 251
Away 100 174 11
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